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I. INTRODUCTION

In Ryan Contracting,Inc. v. JAG Investments, Inc.1 the Minnesota
Supreme Court ruled that, in absence of an express provision in
the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure or elsewhere providing for
joint venture service of process, no such method of service exists in
Minnesota. Shortly after that decision, in Mellett v. FairviewHealth
Services,2 the supreme court extended its holding in Ryan and

t The author is a trial attorney with the law firm of Ballard Spahr Andrews
& Ingersoll, LLP in Baltimore, Maryland. His practice focuses on construction,
commercial, civil rights, bankruptcy and intellectual property litigation.
1. 634 N.W.2d 176 (Minn. 2001) [hereinafter Ryan I1].
2. 634 N.W.2d 421 (Minn. 2001).
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refused to recognize ajoint enterprise service of process rule.3 The
message from these two cases is clear: The Minnesota Supreme
Court takes service of process seriously and will strictly construe the
rules applicable to it. But while these decisions do much to clarify
the court's position on interpreting rules of service of process, they
potentially open a Pandora'sbox concerning the jurisdiction of
Minnesota courts overjoint ventures and enterprises.
II. BACKGROUND

A. JointEnterprisesandJoint Ventures
1. JointEnterprises
The term 'joint enterprise" refers to "a cooperative
undertaking to carry out a small number of activities or objectives,
or even a single one, entered into by members of the group under
such circumstances that all have a voice in directing the conduct of
the enterprise., 4 For such a relationship to exist in Minnesota two
elements must be present: "(1) a mutual understanding for a
common purpose, and (2) a right to a voice in the direction and
purpose.,5
control of the means used to carry out the common
Generally, in the context of ajoint enterprise, each member is
considered the agent or servant of the others, so that the act of any
member within the scope of the enterprise is charged vicariously
against the rest.6 "Thus, when the negligence of a member of a
joint enterprise (acting within the scope of the enterprise) causes
harm to a third person, such negligence
7 is imputed to all other
members, who become mutually liable.
2. Joint Ventures
A joint venture is an association of persons or companies
3. The author thanks attorneys Barbara A. Burke and Mark R. Whitmore for
providing copies of the pertinent legal memoranda filed in Mellett.
4. Pritchett v. Kimberling Cove, Inc., 568 F.2d 570, 579 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 922 (1978) (applying Minnesota law).
5. Olson v. Ische, 343 N.W.2d 284, 288 (Minn. 1984) (quoting Delgado v.
Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479, 482 (Minn. 1979)).
6. Pritchett,568 F.2d at 579-80 (citations omitted).
7. Id. at 580.
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jointly undertaking some commercial enterprise. 8 For such a
relationship to exist in Minnesota four elements must be present:
(1) contribution, i.e., the parties must combine money, property,
time, or skill in some common undertaking; (2) joint
proprietorship or control, i.e., a propriety interest and right of
mutual control over the subject matter of the property engaged in
the venture; (3) sharing of profits and loss; and (4) a contract,
whether express or implied, showing thatjoint venture was entered
into.9 The basic difference between a joint venture and joint
enterprise is that "[a] business relationship is needed for a joint
venture but not ajoint enterprise," or, to be more precise, "ajoint
venture requires an agreement to share profits as well as a contract
demonstrating the existence of the joint relationship."' °
Consequently, while all joint ventures are joint enterprises, not all
joint
enterprises
are
joint
ventures."
It has been said that a joint venture is a species of
partnership. Not surprisingly, therefore, under Minnesota law,
"the rules and principles applicable to a partnership relation, with
few if any material exceptions, govern and control the rights,
duties, and obligations of the parties [to a joint venture]. " "
Accordingly, joint venturers, like partners, are jointly liable for
negligent work undertaken on behalf of their mutual
undertaking,14 and "their members may be sued individually and

8. Meyers v. Postal Fin. Co., 287 N.W.2d 614, 617 (Minn. 1979). In Meyers,
the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that a "U]oint venture is a remedial status
imposed by a court to hold a party responsible for the results of an enterprise over
which the party has effective control even though it is not nominally responsible."
Id.
9. Rehnberg v. Minn. Homes, Inc., 236 Minn. 230, 235, 52 N.W.2d 454, 457
(1952); Beehner v. Cragon Corp., 636 N.W.2d 821, 832 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001),
review denied; Powell v. Trans Global Tours, Inc., 594 N.W.2d 252, 256 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1999).
10. Mellett, 634 N.W.2d at 424 (quoting Olson, 343 N.W.2d at 288).

11.

Id. at 424.

12.

Ringier Am. Inc. v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 106 F.3d 825, 828 (8th Cir. 1997);

see also Salt Lake Knee & Sports Rehab., Inc. v. Salt Lake City Knee & Sports Med.,
909 P.2d 266, 269 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citing cases for the proposition thatjoint
ventures are separate legal entities subject to same rules as partnerships).
13. Ringier, 106 F.3d at 828 (quoting Rehnberg, 236 Minn. at 235, 52 N.W.2d at
457).
14. Austin P. Keller Constr. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 379 N.W.2d
533, 535 (Minn. 1986); Krengel v. Midwest Automatic Photo, Inc., 295 Minn. 200,
208, 203 N.W.2d 841, 846 (1973).
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found liable for damages caused by the joint venture. '' 15 Ajoint
venture, like a partnership, "continues to exist legally as long as 1it6
venture."
can be found liable for damages arising from [the] joint
B. Minnesota'sService Requirements
Rule 3.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that a civil action is commenced against a defendant when the
summons is served upon that defendant or when the summons is
delivered to the sheriff for service in the county where the
defendant resides, provided the summons is actually served on that
defendant within sixty days after service. 7 In general, Rule 4.03 of
the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure governs service of process.
It requires that service on a partnership or association be made "by
delivering a copy to a member or the managing agent of the
In the case of a corporation, it
partnership or association. '
mandates that service be made on "an officer or managing agent,
or to any other agent authorized expressly or impliedly or
designated by statute to receive service of summons ...."'9 Rule
4.03 is silent as to how service must be made on joint enterprises
ventures.
joint
and
The purpose behind Rule 4.03 is to give actual, formal notice
to defendants of pending actions. 20 Ordinarily, this is accomplished
by a sheriff or process server handing of a copy of the summons
21
and complaint to the defendant. Where entities are already
parties to an action, however, service of pleadings may be mailed to
their attorneys under Rule 5.02. In applicable part, that rule
provides:
Whenever under these rules service is required or
permitted to be made upon a party represented by an
attorney, the service shall be made upon the attorney
15.

Austin P. Keller Constr. Co., 379 N.W.2d at 535.

16. Id.
17. MINN. R. Civ. P. 3.01 (2001).
18. MINN. R. Civ. P. 4.03(b) (2001).
19. MINN. R. Civ. P. 4.03(c) (2001).
20. O'Sell v. Peterson, 595 N.W.2d 870, 872 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
21. Erickson v. Coast Catamaran Corp., 414 N.W.2d 180, 183 (Minn. 1987)
("The primary concern with allowing an agent to receive service for the
corporation has generally been to protect a defendant from any prejudice which
could result from lack of notice.").
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unless service upon the party is ordered by the court.
Written admission of service by the party or the party's
attorney shall be sufficient proof of service. Service upon
the attorney or upon a party shall be made by delivering a
copy to the attorney or party; transmitting a copy by
facsimile machine to the attorney or party's office; or by
mailing a copy to the attorney or party at the attorney's or
party's last known address ....
Whether it be under Rule 4.03, Rule 5.02 or another service of
process rule, service must be made in strict accordance with the
applicable rule, since service in a manner not authorized by the
rules
is
ineffective.
Prior to Ryan and Mellett, a very real question existed in
Minnesota as to how to interpret the procedural rules governing
service of process. The uncertainty in this area resulted from two
inconsistent lines of cases. On the one hand, some cases have held
that service of process requirements, like other procedural rules,
should be construed liberally.23 The rationale being that
controversies should be decided on their merits rather than on
24
technicalities. On the other hand, some cases refused to treat
service of process as a mere technicality. These cases viewed service
of process as serving the important function of actual, formal
notice to the defendant of the action.25 Thus, these cases held that
service of process requirements should be strictly construed. 26
Prior to Ryan and Mellett, therefore, there was no clear precedence

22. Tullis v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 570 N.W.2d 309, 311 (Minn. 1997).
23. Derrick v. Drolson Co., 244 Minn. 144, 155, 69 N.W.2d 124, 131
(1955)("Rule 4.03(c) ... like other procedural rules, should be liberally
construed.").
24. Pederson v. Clarkson Lindley Trust, 519 N.W.2d 234, 235 (Minn. Ct. App.
1994) ("a fundamental principle of the rules of civil procedure is that cases should
be decided on the merits rather than on technicalities, and where the intended
recipient receives actual notice of the action, the rules governing such service
should be liberally construed to avoid depriving a litigant of his day in court."); see
also Thomes v. Atkins, 52 F.Supp. 405, 409 (D. Minn. 1943) (stating that the
statute authorizing service on nonresident licensed broker by service on
commissioner of securities should be construed broadly).
25. See Patterson v. Wu Family Corp., 608 N.W.2d 863, 867 (Minn. 2000)
("We have not treated service of process as a mere technicality, as it serves the
important function of actual, formal notice to the defendant of the action.").
26. Berryhill v. Sepp, 106 Minn. 458, 459, 119 N.W. 404, 404
(1909) ("[S]ervice must accord strictly with statutory requirements."); Lundgren v.
Green, 592 N.W.2d 888, 890 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that service of process
must accord strictly with statutory requirements).
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on how to interpret the rules governing service of process in
situations where those rules are silent.
C. Service on JointEnterprises andJoint Ventures in Other
Jurisdictions
Although neither the court of appeals nor the supreme court
looked outside of Minnesota to determine whether to recognize a
joint enterprise and/or joint venture rule of service, other
jurisdictions have wrestled with this issue in circumstances similar
to that of Ryan and Mellett, i.e., situations were their state law was
silent on this issue. In Florida, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Judicial District, took the same position as the Minnesota Supreme
Court that the procedural rules governing service of process must
be strictly construed. In absence of express statutory language, that
court refused to recognize a joint service of process rule under
Florida law:
[W] e note that statutes involving service of process upon
non-residents must be accorded a strict construction ....
Moreover, ajoint venture is not a legal entity in the same
sense of a partnership, even though the distinction is
often blurred. From our reading of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Largay Enterprises, Inc. v. Berman, we conclude
that service of process upon one member of a joint
enterprise is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction over
another member under the law of this state.
But this seems to be a minority point of view. At least in the
case of joint ventures, the majority of courts have held that joint
ventures are subject to the same rules as partnerships. 28 Since
service on one member of the partnership generally constitutes
service on all members, these courts recognize a joint venture
service of process rule. These courts include appellate courts in
New York29 and Illinois,30 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 31 the
27. Elting Ctr. Corp. v. Diversified Title Corp., 306 So.2d 542, 543 (Fla. Dist.
App. 1975) (citations omitted).
28.

See 46 AM.JUR. 2DJoint Ventures § 73 (2002).

29. John's, Inc. v. Island Garden Ctr. of Nassau, Inc., 269 N.Y.S.2d 231, 236
(1966); Sullivan Realty Org., Inc. v. Syart Trading Corp., 68 A.D.2d 756, 759 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1979).
30. Pyskaty v. Oyama, 641 N.E.2d 552, 569 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994);Japczyk v. Gust
K. Newberg Constr. Co., 586 N.E.2d 572, 574 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
31. Cent. Contracting Co. v. C.E. Youngdahl & Co., 209 A.2d 810, 814 (Pa.
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3
Arizona Supreme Court,
33 " and the United States Court of Appeals
Circuit.
for the Third

III. THE CASES: RYANAND MELLE77

A. Ryan: Facts and ProceduralHistory
1. Facts
a. The Parties
Several property owners and a land developer entered into a
joint venture to develop several parcels of residential property
known as the Fairway Hills residential development project,
Chaska, Minnesota.34 The landowner of most of the property being
developed was JAG Investment, Inc. ('JAG")

.3

Its sole shareholder

wasJimJagodzinski.i JimJagodzinski's father, Joe Jagodzinski, was
the president and sole shareholder of the developer, Jagodzinski
Development Corporation ('jDC").37 Although JAG was not the
only party to own portions of the Fair Hills property, it was the only
supreme court.
party to appeal the court of appeals' ruling to the
b.

The Underlying Cause of Action

In April 1997, JAG contracted with Ryan Contracting, Inc.
("Ryan") to perform clearing, grading, sewer and water main
installation and street construction at the Fairway Hills's property.39
In turn, Ryan subcontracted with GMH Asphalt Corporation
("GMH") to perform street and paving work. On April 8, 1998,

1965).
32. Columbia Group, Inc. v. Jackson, 725 P.2d 1110, 1113 (Ariz. 1986).
33. Bloomfield Mech. Contracting, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev.
Comm., 519 F.2d 1257, 1261 (3d Cir. 1975).
34. Ryan Contracting, Inc. v. JAG Inv., Inc., 609 N.W. 2d 642, 644 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2000) [hereinafter Ryan 1].
35. Ryan II, supranote 1, at 179.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 179 n.1.
39. Id. at 179.
40. Ryan I, supranote 34, at 644.
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Ryan served and filed a mechanics' lien against the Fairway Hills
property to recover amounts it claimed JDC owed it. 4 Although

the lien listed Ryan's last day of work as December 16, 1997, Ryan
later claimed that it performed additional work after the lien was
filed, and that its last day of work on the property was actually
September 13, 1998.42 On October 5, 1998, GMH served and filed
its own mechanics' lien on the property that listed GMH's last day
of work as June 16, 1998. 43
On December 4, 1998, Ryan filed a complaint against JDC,
JAG and GMH, which, among other things, sought to foreclose on
Ryan's lien." In its Complaint, Ryan specifically alleged thatJDC
and JAG "are related business entities and share common
ownership and control."45 Ryan personally servedJDC on that same
day by serving its summons and complaint on Joe Jagodzinski, but
did not serve JAG. 46 Nonetheless, JAG answered Ryan's complaint
on December 23, 1998, and raised as the affirmative defense lack of
personal jurisdiction.47
On December 28, 1998, GMH filed its answer and asserted a
cross-claims against JAG, which, among other things, sought to
foreclose GMH's mechanics' lien. 48 Pursuant to Minnesota Rule of
Civil Procedure 5.02, GMH served its answer and cross-claim on the
parties' attorneys. 49 At no point did it personally serve its pleadings

on

JAG.
On July, 15, 1999, JAG and JDC filed a motion for summary
judgment.5 In the memorandum of law supporting that motion, 2
JAG argued for dismissal of Ryan's complaint and release of JAG's
property from Ryan and GMH's liens based upon lack of personal
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Ryan II, supra note 1, at 179.
Id.
Id. at 180 n.4.
Id. at 179.
Ryan I, supranote 34, at 645.
Ryan II, supranote 1, at 179.
Id. at 180.
Id.
Id.

50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,

show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that either party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. MINN. R. Civ. P. 56.03; Goeb v Tharaldson, 615
N.W.2d 800, 817 (Minn. 2000).
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jurisdiction. JAG also argued for summary judgment based upon
the merits of the case. Shortly thereafter, sometime in August
1999, eight months after the one-year time limit had expired, Ryan
personally servedJAG.54
2. District Court

On September 21, 1999, the district court denied JAG's
motion for summary judgment, finding that it had personal
jurisdiction overJAG even though it was "undisputed that [Ryan]
never served [JAG] ... individually with the Summons and
Complaint during" the one-year time limit set by Minnesota
Statutes section 514.12 subdivision 3.55 Indeed, the district court
found that December 16, 1997, was Ryan's last day of work, and
that Ryan had until December 16, 1998 to serve JAG. Although
Ryan servedJDC by that deadline, it did not personally serve JAG by
56
then.
Nonetheless, the district court held that Ryan had
effectively served JAG under alternative theories of service:
[B]oth [Ryan] and GMH Asphalt argue that the lien
foreclosures are still valid. [JAG] has appeared and
participated in every aspect of this case. In addition,
Defendant JDC and [JAG] are undertaking the
development of the subject property as a 'joint venture"..
. . Defendants was [sic] served and did file answers and
responsive papers on behalf of his clients. Furthermore,
the action itself, which names [JAG as a party], was
commenced within the required time period. For these
reasons, [Ryan] and GMH argue that property owners
have been made party to the action. The Court agrees
and finds that, based on all the reasons just discussed,
[JAG is a] legitimate part[y] to this action .... Thus,
[JAG is] subject to judgment on the foreclosure of the
mechanic's liens and the motion for summary judgment
on this point is denied. 57
Its motion for summary judgment having been denied, JAG
appealed the district court's decision to the court of appeals.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Ryan II, supra note 1, at 180.
Id.
SeeMINN. STAT. § 514.12, subd. 3 (2000).
Ryan II,supranote 1, at 180.
Id. at 180-81.
Id.at 181.
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3. Court of Appeals
Noting that whether "one member of joint venture is an
'agent' authorized to accept service of process for another
member" was an issue of first impression in Minnesota, the court of
appeals in a published opinion agreed with the district court's
analysis that service againstJAG and the other property owners was
effective under ajoint venture theory of service. 59 In the absence of
direct authority on point, the court of appeals looked to the
supreme court's holding in Erickson v. Coast Catamaran Corp., in
which that court observed: "The primary concern with allowing an
agent to receive service for the corporation has generally been to
protect a defendant from prejudice which could result from lack of
notice."
The court of appeals then cited its prior decision of
Pederson v. Clarkson Lindley Trust for the proposition that the
procedural rules governing service should be liberally construed. 6'
The court also observed that mandates of the mechanics' lien
statutes required "that the substantive rights of lien claimants
should not be decided on technical grounds, particularly if no
harm results., 62 Thus, the court of appeals applied a liberal
reading of the Rules of Civil Procedure and mechanics' lien
statutes, and held that those rules implicitly allowed for joint
63
venture
service
of
process.
Finding thatJDC andJAG engaged in ajoint venture and that
JDC had properly been served, the court concluded that "[s] ervice
of process onJAG was effective becauseJAG'sjoint-venture partner
was properly served, JAG received actual notice, and JAG was not
prejudiced."64 Having lost again, JAG appealed to the Minnesota
Supreme Court.

59. Ryan I, supra note 34, at 645.
60. Id. (quoting Erickson v. Coast Catamaran Corp., 414 N.W.2d 180, 183
(Minn. 1987)).
61. Id. at 645 n.2 (quoting Pederson v. Clarkson Lindley Trust, 519 N.W.2d at
235).
62. Id. at 645 (citing R.B. Thompson, Jr. Lumber Co. v. Windsor Dev. Corp.,
383 N.W.2d 357, 361 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)).
63. Id. at 646.
64. Id. at 647.
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B. The Ryan Decision
1. The Court'sDecision as to Ryan
a. Joint-Venture Theory of Service
JAG protested the lower courts' finding that it had properly
been served under a joint-venture theory of service because it
argued no such relationship existed between it and JDC.6 5
Although it agreed with JAG that the question of whether such a
relationship existed was an unresolved factual issue, the supreme
66
court did not base its opinion on that finding. Rather, the court
focused on whether Minnesota recognized ajoint-venture theory of
service at all. For the answer to this question, the court looked to
the Rules of Civil Procedure and Minnesota mechanics' lien
statutes, and found that neither "expressly permit joint-venture-67
based

service.

The court then turned to the issue of whether the Minnesota
Rules of Civil Procedure could be construed to allow for such
service. While the court of appeals had looked to precedent that
permitted Minnesota's procedural rules to be construed liberally,
the Supreme court cited its own precedent to the opposite effect:
"Moreover, 'we have not treated service of process as a mere
technicality, as it serves the important function of actual, formal
notice to the defendant of the action."' 8 The court went on to
state: "Recognizing the important function that service of process
fulfills, and recognizing the due process implications involved, we
have always required parties to adhere strictly to service
requirements." 69 Thus, the court applied a strict interpretation to
,,70
rule.
the rules and declined "to adopt a joint-venture service
Noting that the court of appeals also supported its decision by

65. Ryan II, supra note 1, at 182.
66. Id.
67. Id. (citing State v. Moseng, 254 Minn. 263, 269, 95 N.W.2d 6, 11-12
In Moseng, the court determined that in the absence of an express
(1959)).
provision, the court may not supply amendments to the statute. Moseng, 254 Minn.
at 269, 95 N.W.2d at 11-12.
68. Ryan II, supra note 1, at 182 (quoting Patterson,608 N.W.2d at 867).
69. Id. (citing Tullis, 570 N.W.2d at 311 and Berryhill, 106 Minn. at 459, 119
N.W.at 404).
70. Id.
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stating that JAG was not prejudiced by Ryan's improper service
because JAG had actual notice of the suit, the supreme court
pointed out that, "'actual notice of the lawsuit will not subject
defendants to personal jurisdiction without substantial compliance
with' the rules of service."' Ergo, the court concluded that 'JAG's
more, is insufficient to
actual notice of the lien action without
2
subjectJAG to personal jurisdiction.,
b.

Ryan's Alternative Arguments

In the event that the supreme court rejected its theory ofjointventure service, Ryan argued that the lower courts' decisions
should be upheld on two alternative grounds: (1) that despite the
district court and court of appeals' conclusions to the contrary, it
did serve JAG within the one-year time limit imposed by the lien
statutes and therefore made JAG a party to its lien action; and (2)
thatJAG waived its jurisdictional defense through its participation
in the litigation.7 3
(1) Ryan's One-Year Time Limit Argument
While acknowledging that the requirements for creating a
mechanics' lien are to be strictly construed, Ryan argued that the
one-year time limit for service of a mechanics' lien complaint
pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 514.12, subdivision 3, was
an enforcement provision and, thus, should be liberally
construed.74 Thus, Ryan argued that it had fundamentally satisfied
the one-year time limit to commence its action because it had filed
its summons and complaint within one year of December 16, 1997,
75
which marked its last day of work as listed in its lien statement.
The supreme court disagreed with Ryan's contention that the oneyear time limit was simply an enforcement provision:

71. Id. (quoting Tulis, 570 N.W.2d at 311).
72. Id. at 183. See also Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Minn. 1988)
("Actual notice will not subject defendants to personal jurisdiction absent
substantial compliance with Rule 4."); Larson v. New Richland Care Ctr., 520
N.W.2d 480, 482 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) ("Actual notice of a lawsuit will not subject
a defendant to personal jurisdiction unless the plaintiff substantially complied with
MINN.

73.
74.
75.

R. Cv. P. 4.").
Ryan II, supra note 1, at 183.
Id.
Id.
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The one-year limitation of the lien statutes is no ordinary
statute of limitations; it puts a limit to the life and
duration of the lien .... The statute requires that not
only filing a complaint, but also making the defendantlandowner a party to the suit-accomplished by serving
the defendant-landowner with the summons-must be
done with in one year.6
The court concluded, therefore, that "the one-year time limit on
service, like the one-year time limit on filing the complaint, is not
merely an enforcement provision of the statute but rather is a
requirement for the creation of a lien action and must be strictly
construed. ' ' 77 Since Ryan had not served its complaint on JAG
within one year from its last day of work, Ryan's lien action against
JAG
ceased
to
exist after
that one-year
period.8
Ryan also argued that it had satisfied the one-year time limit of
section 514.12, subdivision 3, because its last day of work was
actually September 13, 1998, not December 16, 1997 as indicated
in its lien statement, so that it had served JAG within one year of its
last day of work on the property. 79 In rejecting this argument, the
court again applied a strict construction standard to section
514.12. As the court observed, the plain language of that statute
requires that a mechanics' lien "complaint be filed, and that service
be made 'within one year after the date of the last item of the claim
as set in the recorded lien statement.,,,1 The court further buttressed
this conclusion by citing to policy considerations:
This conclusion is supported not only by the plain
language of section 514.12, subd. 3, but also by strong
policy considerations: "It has been the policy of our
statutes creating mechanics' liens to fix a definite time
when such liens should terminate, to the end that those
interested in the property, or dealing with it, might know

76. Id.
77. Id. at 183-84; see also Dolder v. Griffin, 323 N.W.2d 773, 780 (Minn. 1982)
(stating that the requirements for the attachment and creation of a mechanic's
lien should be strictly construed). See generally Maurice T. Brunner, Annotation,
Who Is The Owner Within Mechanic's Lien Statute Requiring Notice Of Claim, 76
A.L.R.3D 605 (1977) (discussing the interpretation of mechanic's lien laws).
78. Ryan I,supra note 1, at 184.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 514.12, subd. 3).
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with certainty when it was free from such claims ....
Accordingly, Ryan had until December 16, 1998 to serve JAG, so
that its August 1999 service was untimely.
(2) Ryan's Waiver Argument
Ryan's final argument was that JAG had effectively waived its
jurisdictional defense through its active participation in the
litigation." Ryan's last argument, in many ways, was one of its
strongest arguments. JAG had fully participated in the litigation
and, as Ryan noted, had taken the following actions consistent with
its having waived jurisdictional defenses: (1) JAG waited seven
months after answering before moving for summaryjudgment due
to lack of personal jurisdiction; (2) during that time, JAG served
discovery requests on the parties; (3) JAG noticed and attended
depositions on the merits of the claims; (4) JAG attended court
ordered mediation; (5) JAG filed a motion to compel discovery
responses and requested reimbursement of its costs and fees for
having done so. s4 In addition, JAG moved for summary judgment
on
the
merits
of
the
claims 5
In ruling on Ryan's waiver argument, the court looked to its
86
recent decision of Pattersonv. Wu Family Corporation.
In Patterson,
the court had found that, although the defendant asserted lack of
personal jurisdiction as an affirmative defense in its answer, it had
nonetheless waived that defense when it invoked thejurisdiction of
the district court to obtain a partial summary judgment on the
merits without earlier or simultaneously moving to dismiss the
complaint for insufficient process. 87 The Ryan court differentiated
JAG's action from those of the defendant in Pattersonin that JAG
had moved for summary judgment on the merits and on
insufficiency of process at the same time.88 Thus, the court
reasoned, unlike the Patterson defendant, JAG had not failed to
provide the court with an opportunity to rule on the issue of

82.

Id. (quoting Bauman v. Metzger, 145 Minn. 133, 140, 176 N.W. 497, 500

(1920)).
83.

Id.

84.
85.

Id. at 185.
Id.

86.

Id. (citing Patterson,608 N.W.2d 863).

87.
88.

Patterson,608 N.W.2d at 867.
Ryan II, supra note 1, at 185.
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proper service before ruling on the merits. Accordingly, the court
found thatJAG had not waived its personal jurisdiction defense. 90
2. The Court's Decision as to GMH
Having concluded that Ryan did not serve JAG and that the
district court had no personal jurisdiction, the court turned to
whether GMH's cross-claim againstJAG survived.9' Again, this issue
turned on whether GMH's service on JAG was proper. GMH had
not personally served JAG but, instead, relying upon Minnesota
Rule of Civil Procedure 5.02, had mailed its papers to JAG's
attorney.92 Under Rule 5.02, such service would be permissible if
JAG was already a party to the litigation. 3 But havingjust held that
since JAG was not a party to Ryan's lawsuit, the court found that
GMH could not rely on Rule 5.02 and that its service on JAG's
attorney
was
ineffective.9
Although it recognized that GMH was bound to intervene in
Ryan's original proceeding and that GMH could not have known
about the deficiency of Ryan's service, the court was not
sympathetic to GMH's plight.9 5 The court observed that GMH
could have avoided the problem by personally serving its answer on
JAG pursuant to Rule 4.03. Citing two Minnesota legal education
publications, the court pointed out that personal service
in such
• 97
situations had always been the recommended practice. The court
then re-emphasized what it had said with regard to Ryan's service:
"Service rules should be clear; parties should not be left to guess
what, under different factual scenarios, will be an acceptable
method of service. Requiring strict compliance achieves this
result."98 Consequently, the court reversed the court of appeals and
dismissed GMH's lien claim for lack of personal service.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 187.
Id.
Id. at 188.
Id. at 187.
Id. (referring to MINN. R. CiV. P. 4.03(c)).
Id. at 188.
Id.
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3. The Dissent
The minority's concurring and dissenting opinion (the
"Dissent"), which was written by Justice Gilbert and joined by
Justice Paul Anderson, agreed with the majority's decision
declining to adopt a joint-venture service rule. 99 The Dissent also
agreed with the majority "that actual notice of the mechanics' lien
action without service was insufficient to subject JAG to personal
jurisdiction. "'0 But because additional theories of personal
jurisdiction existed that had not been considered by the lower
courts, the Dissent believed that the case should have been
remanded back to the district court for further factual findings
rather than simply reversed.0 1 The dissent also disagreed with the
majority's ruling as to GMH because it held that the Minnesota
Lien Statutes modified the rules of service in the context of
mechanics' lien litigation and
that GMH's service onJAG complied
12
rules.
modified
those
with
a. PersonalJurisdictionOverJAG in Ryan's Lien Action
The Dissent agreed with the majority's refusal to adopt ajointventure service rule.0 ° It also agreed with the majority's finding
that actual notice of a mechanics' lien action without service is
insufficient to subject a party to personal jurisdiction. 0 4 To hold
otherwise, the Dissent stated would be "to create new rules of
service of process or depart from the plain meaning of statutory
language." °5 The Dissent and the majority parted ways, however,
on this issue of whether the case should have been remanded
rather than reserved. 16 The Dissent would have remanded the case
to the district court for further factual
findings regarding the
7
relationship betweenJDC and JAG.

Specifically, Ryan's complaint alleged thatJDC and JAG were
"related business entities and share common ownership and

99.

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 188-89.
Id.
at 189.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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control."'0 " That allegation, the Dissent argued, raised two theories
that could support a finding that the district court had personal
jurisdiction over JAG. First, there could be a principal-agent
relationship betweenJDC and JAG such that service uponJDC was
sufficient to provide personal jurisdiction overJAG.1 °9 Second,JDC
and JAG may have been a family partnership so that service upon
JAG. 110
upon
service
constituted
JDC
In support of this argument, the Dissent pointed to several
facts in the record. First, it observed that the record indicated that
JAG was wholly owned byJimJagodzinski and thatJDC was wholly
owned byJimJagodzinski's father,JoeJagodzinski.
Second, there
was some indication that JAG and JDC operated out of the same
Fairway Hills office, so that it was unclear who really owned the Fair
Hills property."2 Finally, there was a joint-venture and profit
sharing agreement betweenJDC and JAG.13 All of these facts the
Dissent believed either suggested that JDC and JAG engag4ed in
business as a partnership or thatJDC was an agent of JAG. At a
minimum, these facts indicated "that Ryan's improvements to
Fairway Hills through JDC were done with the knowledge and
consent ofJAG.""'5 Thus, the Dissent contended it was possible that6
service ofJDC was sufficient service as toJAG in the Ryan's action'
and it would have remanded this issue back to the district court for
further
factual
inquiry.! 7
The Dissent also found that remanding the case back to the
district court was appropriate under modern day notice pleading
practice, which it held required a broad reading of Ryan's
108. Id.
109. Id. The court referred to the agency rule in Derrick v. Drolson Co. Id.
Derrick defined agency as "the relationship that results from the manifestation of
consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject
to control, and consent by the other to act." Derrick v. Drolson Co., 244 Minn.
144, 148, 69 N.W.2d 124, 127 (1955). But see Wold v.J.B. Colt Co. 102 Minn. 386,
389, 114 N.W. 243, 243 (1907) (stating that for the purposes of receiving service of
summons, an agency relationship created by estoppel or implication of law is not
sufficient).
110. Ryan II, supra note 1, at 189. See MINN. STAT. § 540.152 (2000).
111. Ryan II, supra note 1, at 189.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 190.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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complaint:
The majority's summary disposition of this case selectively
ignores our notice pleading standard. In dismissing this
case, the majority is granting JAG summary judgment
relief on one jurisdictional ground-the joint-venture
theory-even though the parties never advanced thejointventure theory ofjurisdiction to the district court. Yet the
majority ignores the agency and partnership theories of
jurisdiction that were placed before the district court by
Ryan's complaint. Since the days of the code pleadings
are gone, Ryan properly raised the agency and
partnership theories of personal jurisdiction by asserting
in its complaint that JDC and JAG are "related business
' 8
entities and share common ownership and control.
Moreover, the Dissent held that a remand of the action was more in
keeping with the purpose of the Minnesota Mechanics' Lien
Statute, since its stated purpose is "to protect the rights of workmen
and material men who furnish labor and material in the
improvement of real estate."" 9 The statute's longstanding promise
was that "he whose property is enhanced in value by the labor and
way by payment
toil of others should be made to respond in some
20
and full satisfaction for what he has secured.'
b. PersonalJurisdictionOverJAG in GMH's Cross-claim
The Dissent also rejected the majority's reasoning as to GMH's
cross-claim, accusing the majority of "improperly import[ing] the
rules of civil procedure into our mechanics' lien jurisprudence."'I'
Specifically, the Dissent agreed that, while the Mechanics' Lien
Statutes do not set forth rules of service of process, that alone does
not mean that they fail to provide rules for making one a party to a
mechanics' lien action. 22 Under the rules for establishing party
status detailed in the Mechanics' Lien Statutes, the Dissent

118. Id. The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure state that "pleadings must
generally consist of a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief..."MINN. R. CrV. P. 8.01. Also, the Minnesota Rules
state that "pleading[s] shall be simple, concise, and direct." MINN. R. Civ. P. 8.05.
119. Ryan lI, supranote l, at 190.
120. Id. at 191 (quoting Emery v. Hertig, 60 Minn. 54, 57, 61 N.W. 830, 831
(1895)).
121. Id. at 193.
122. Id. at 191.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss2/1

18

Berlage:OF
A Clear
Message-Regarding
Service of Process&onENTERPRISES
Joint Ventures &
2002] SERVICE
PROCESS
JOINT VENTURES

563

contended one could be made a party without being served:
Under the rules of civil procedure, service and party status
are inextricably linked. One must be served to be a party.
Under the rules for establishing party status detailed in
the Mechanics' Lien Statute, however, one can be a party
without being served. In arguing that party status is always
a function of service of process, the majority improperly
imposes a rule applicable in ordinary civil actions on
statutory mechanics' lien actions. This directly contradicts
the Mechanics'
Lien Statute as well as prior decisions of
13
this court.
The Dissent then cited a 1893 case, Sandbergv. Palm,2 4 a 1920 case,
Bauman v. Metzge, 2 5 and a 1925 case, Olson & Serley Sash & Door Co.
v. Juckem, 126 for the proposition that the filing of an answer
commences an action to foreclose on a mechanics' lien and that
service is merely a collateral issue. 27 Therefore, the Dissent would
have ruled that, when GMH filed its answer with the court, it was in
compliance with all of the statutory requirements for commencing
2
8
the action and thatJAG was a proper party to that action.1
C. Mellett: Facts and ProceduralHistory
1. Facts
On January 3, 1997, Susannah Mellett voluntarily sought
chemical dependency treatment at Fairview Southdale Hospital.'29
While at the hospital, she was placed on a 72-hour hold '30 and
transported to Fairview Riverside Medical Center ("Fairview
Riverside") where Dr. David Johnson, a psychiatrist, treated her.
Mellett voluntarily remained at Fairview Riverside in its chemical
31
dependency program after the 72-hour medical hold expired.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
53 Minn. 252, 255,54 N.W. 1109, 1109 (1893).
145 Minn. 133, 140, 176 N.W. 497, 500 (1920).
163 Minn. 375, 377, 204 N.W. 51, 52 (1925).
Ryan II, supra note 1, at 191-92.
Id. at 192.

129.

Mellett v. Fairview Health Services, 634 N.W.2d 421, 423 (Minn. 2001).

130. See MINN. STAT. § 253B.05, subds. 1, 3 (2000). Under this provision, a
treatment facility may hold a patient for up to seventy two hours for the purpose of
emergency care and treatment. Id.
131. Id.
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On January 10, Mellett decided to leave the program, but changed
her mind after speaking with her mother. Shortly after that,
Fairview Riverside initiated another 72-hour hold. 1 2 Prior to the
expiration of the second hold, Fairview Riverside filed a petition to
have Mellett involuntarily committed. 13 As part of the commitment
proceedings, Dr. Johnson completed an "Examiner's Statement in
According to Mellett,
Support of Petition for Commitment."
when the second 72-hour hold expired, Fairview Riverside
continued to hold her pending the resolution of the commitment
petition.15
At a preliminary hearing on January 21, a referee ordered
36
Mellett released and scheduled another hearing forJanuary 24.
Mellett claims that, despite the referee's order, Fairview Riverside
did not allow her to leave for several hours. 13 7 At the January 24
hearing, the referee found that Mellett's chemical dependency
problems could be adequately addressed through voluntary
inpatient treatment and, thus, dismissed Fairview Riverside's
prejudice. 3
petition
without
commitment
Two years later, Mellett brought an action against Fairview
Riverside, Dr. Johnson and others associated with the hospital,
alleging defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
negligence and false imprisonment. 3 9 Mellett served a copy of her
summons and complaint on Fairview Riverside on January 21,
1999. 14 She delivered a copy of the summons and complaint to the
County Sheriff for service on Dr. Johnson at some point between
January 22 andJanuary 25, 1999.
2. District Court
Dr. Johnson moved for summary judgment against all of
Mellett's claims on the ground that they were time barred.142 In
132.

Id. See MINN. STAT. § 253B.07, subd. 2(c) (2000).

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 422-23.
Id. at 423.
Id.
Id.
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response, Mellett argued that her claims against Dr. Johnson were
not time barred because Dr. Johnson was engaged in a joint
enterprise with Fairview Riverside, so that her timely service on
Fairview Riverside constituted timely service on him. 43 The district
court rejected Mellett's argument and granted Dr. Johnson's
motion for summaryjudgment.' 44
3. Court of Appeals
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's holding that
Mellett's claims were time barred, except for her false
imprisonment claim. 45 With respect to that claim, the court of
appeals found the applicable statute of limitations period to be twoyears from January 21, 1997, the date Fairview Riverside had
allegedly falsely imprisoned Mellett. 46 The court of appeals found
that Dr. Johnson had engaged in a joint-enterprise with Fairview
Riverside. 47 Adopting ajoint-enterprise theory of service, the court
of appeals concluded that the controlling date of service for all
defendants, including Dr. Johnson, wasJanuary 21, 1999, the date
Mellett served Fairview Riverside.'4 Thus, the court of appeals
held, "Mellett's complaint was timely served within two years49 of the
date that her false imprisonment cause of action accrued."
D. The Mellett Decision
In a unanimous opinion, the supreme court found that its
decision in Ryan controlled whether Minnesota recognized ajointenterprise theory of service. As the court pointed out, there is no
meaningful difference between ajoint-enterprise and joint-venture.
Indeed, the only difference is that a joint-venture "requires an
agreement to share profits as well as a contract demonstrating the
existence of the joint relationship." 5' Thus, the court found that

143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Mellett v. Fairview Health Services, No. CX-00-608, 2000 WL 1376544, at
*3 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2000).
147. Id. at *3 n. 1.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Mellett, 634 N.W.2d at 424.
151. Id.
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"[b]ecause the relationship between joint-venture participants is
closer than the relationship between joint-enterprise participants,
the case forjoint-enterprise-based service being effective for statute
of limitations is even weaker than the case for joint-venture-based
service."'5' Accordingly, the court reversed the court of appeals'
decision and restated the district court's order granting Dr.
Johnson's motion for summary judgment on all counts.
IV. COMMENTARY

A. Strictly ConstruingMinnesota'sProceduralRules
Prior to Ryan and Mellett, two lines of cases existed in
Minnesota on how service of process rules were to be interpreted.54
One line of cases indicated that service of process rules were to be
interpreted broadly, while the other held that they were to be
strictly construed. The Minnesota Supreme Court took the
opportunity, especially in Ryan, to set the record straight that
Minnesota's procedural rules governing service of process are to be
strictly construed. The clarity of this message was not inadvertent.
In holding that service on onejoint enterpriser/venturer does not
constitute service on its co-enterprisers/venturers, the court
arguably ignored its own precedent and that of most other
jurisdictions, which at least in the context of joint ventures hold
that they are analogous to partnerships and that same rules apply
to them.
Additionally, in Ryan, the court's ruling on the parties' waiver
arguments emphasizes how seriously the court takes service of
process. JAG's involvement in the litigation shows, if nothing else,
that it had actual notice of Ryan and GMH's claims. It is one thing
not to recognize ajoint enterprise/venture service of process rule;
it is another to hold that actual notice and active participation in a
lawsuit does not waive insufficient service. Indeed, it is hard to
imagine how the court could have sent a clearer message to the
lower courts and practitioners that service of process rules must be
strictly construed. To this extent, the court's holdings in Ryan and
Mellett are advantageous because clear precedent is important and
152.
153.
154.

Id.
Id.at 425.
See supra Part II.B.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss2/1

22

Berlage:OF
A Clear
Message Regarding
of Process&
onENTERPRISES
Joint Ventures &
2002] SERVICE
PROCESS
- JOINTService
VENTURES

567

Minnesota had a problem with clarity in this area.
The court also accomplished its stated goal that "Service rules
should be clear; parties should not be left to guess what, under55
different factual scenarios, will be acceptable method of service.',1
Its holdings in Ryan and Mellett are straightforward: Plaintiffs must
serve all members of ajoint enterprise/venture. If the court held
the opposite and found a joint enterprise/venture service of
process rule, its application might arguably have been just as clearcut. But it would have been a lost opportunity for the court to
make a definite statement on how service of process rules should
be interpreted. It also might have created additional analysis as
courts wrestled with what constitutes a joint enterprise or joint
venture
for
purposes
of
service.
The dissent's opinion in Ryan is susceptible to such criticism.
Under the dissent's opinion, service of joint enterprises would
require inquiry into whether service was proper on some other
related agency grounds, such as family partnership, principal-agent,
and common ownership. Thus, service would become a grayer
area than it already is, and would be ripe for litigation. In turn, this
would
create
further
delays
and
confusion.
Furthermore, the court's holdings in Ryan and Mellett are easy
to comply with. These holdings require personal service on all
parties. While due process probably does not require this result,
providing actual, formal notice has always been the preferred way
of instituting an action. This fact mitigates some of the harshness
of the court's ruling against GMH. As the court pointed out, the
better practice in Minnesota has always been to personally serve the
parties with pleadings, even when alternative service is available
under the rules. It should also be noted thatJAG telegraphed that
it had not been personally served in its affirmative defenses, which
should have set off Ryan and GMH's alarm bells. Obviously, Ryan
and GMH's attorneys will not make the same mistake twice, and
Minnesota practitioners are well-advised to heed to the court's
message in Ryan and Mellett and to personally serve their pleadings
on all parties.
B. The Effect of Ryan and Mellett On Jurisdiction
While Ryan and Mellett clarify how rules governing service of
155.

Ryan II, supranote 1, at 188.
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process should be interpreted, they raise ajurisdictional question.
How will joint enterprises, comprised of both Minnesota entities
and out-of-state entities, be treated if the out-of-state entity is not
susceptible to service in Minnesota? In such a situation, a plaintiff
could only sue the Minnesota entity for acts of the joint
enterprise/venture in Minnesota. Furthermore, the Minnesota
entity could not bring the party it had entered into a joint
enterprise with into the Minnesota litigation. Its only recourse
against its co-enterpriser would be to file suit in another
jurisdiction
for
contribution.
It is unclear how thisjurisdictional issue will impact Minnesota.
On the one hand, the fact that a plaintiff cannot file suit against
both joint enterprisers in Minnesota may cause a plaintiff in these
circumstances to file suit elsewhere, forcing other jurisdictions to
bear the cost of litigation. On the other hand, a plaintiff in such
situations, especially if they are from Minnesota, may simply file suit
against the Minnesota entity in Minnesota, causing the Minnesota
joint enterpriser to litigate virtually identical cases in two different
jurisdictions. But even if Ryan and Mellett cause plaintiffs to sue
joint enterprises in otherjurisdictions, it will have a negative impact
on Minnesota entities involved injoint enterprises with out-of-state
entities because they will still have to bear the cost of litigation in
foreign jurisdictions.
V. CONCLUSION

While the full impact of Ryan and Mellett remains to be seen,
those decisions will clearly have an impact on how the lower courts
and practitioners in Minnesota view the rules governing service of
process. The supreme court made clear that those rules are to be
taken seriously and strictly construed. It did so, even though its
own precedent, and that of most other jurisdictions strongly
suggest that joint ventures should be treated similarly to
partnerships. Moreover, the Ryan and Mellett decisions raise
important questions concerning the jurisdiction of Minnesota
courts over joint enterprises/ventures carried out by Minnesota
and out-of-state entities in foreign jurisdictions.
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